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Abstract 
The theory of situated conceptualization is introduced, including its core assumptions about the 
construction and storage of situated conceptualizations, the production of pattern completion inferences 
in relevant situations, and the implementation of these inferences via multimodal simulation.  The broad 
applicability of the theory to many phenomena is reviewed, as is its ability to explain individual 
differences.  The theory is then applied to social priming, showing that the theory provides a natural 
account of the diverse forms it takes.  The theory also explains why social priming is difficult to define, 
why it often reflects modulating factors, and why it can be difficult to replicate.  The importance of 
studying pattern completion inferences in the context of meaningful situated action receives emphasis. 
 
 
 
The Theory of Situated Conceptualization 
The construct of situated conceptualization 
developed originally to explain how simulations of 
conceptual knowledge become situated [1–5].  The 
construct was also used initially to explain social 
embodiment effects, a form of social priming [6].  
Recently, situated conceptualization has been 
developed as a more general theoretical framework that 
underlies perception, action, cognition, social 
cognition, affective processing, and appetitive 
processing [7].  After presenting the three basic 
constructs of the theory—situated conceptualization, 
pattern completion inference, and multimodal 
simulation—it is applied to social priming. 
Situated conceptualization.  A central premise 
of the situated conceptualization framework is that 
the brain is a situated processing architecture, 
designed to process situations in the moment and to 
simulate non-present situations in thought [1–7].  As 
a person perceives, cognizes, and acts in the current 
situation (e.g., a coffeehouse), multiple neural 
systems process different situational elements in 
parallel, generating complementary streams of 
information about the situation.  Specifically, 
different neural systems process the current setting 
(parietal lobe, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial 
cortex), objects in the setting (the ventral stream), 
other agents who are present (temporal poles, FFA, 
mPFC, PCC, STG, EBA), self conceptions and self 
relevance (mPFC, PCC), physical actions in the 
environment (motor and somatosensory cortices, 
cerebellum, basal ganglia), and a wide variety of 
mentalizing, affective, and interoceptive responses 
to the situation (mPFC, OFC, lPFC, ACC, insula, 
amygdala, PCC). 
Over time, each of these neural systems produces a 
continuous stream of perceptual experiences (qualia) for 
its respective situational content, along with 
corresponding conceptual interpretations.  While in a 
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coffeehouse, for example, the neural system that 
processes the setting produces a continuous stream of 
perceptual and conceptual information about it.  As 
each system processes its respective situational 
information, association areas integrate these streams of 
“local” information “globally” [7,8].  As a result of this 
integration, a coherent perceptual experience of the 
situation results, along with a coherent conceptual 
interpretation of the complex events occurring (e.g., the 
perceptual experience of being in a coffee house; the 
conceptual interpretation of drinking coffee).  Together, 
the coherent perceptual experience and conceptual 
interpretation constitute a situated conceptualization. 
As a situated conceptualization is constructed, 
associative mechanisms establish a statistical trace 
of it in long-term memory.  If a particular type of 
situation occurs repeatedly, the situated 
conceptualizations that result might become 
integrated into a category of exemplars that 
represents this situation [9,10].  Alternatively, these 
different situated conceptualizations could be 
superimposed onto a common network, such that 
their aggregate effects on network weights represent 
the category.  To the extent that the network 
includes hidden units for capturing correlations 
between local situation elements, it becomes 
possible to statistically maintain information about 
specific exemplars [11, also see 12]. 
Pattern completion inference.  When an element 
of an earlier situation is encountered on a later occasion, 
it may activate a situated conceptualization stored 
previously in a Bayesian manner [13].  On seeing a new 
coffee house in your neighborhood, for example, a 
situated conceptualization for a previous coffeehouse 
could become active that has either been experienced 
frequently (based on priors) or that is a good match with 
the locale (based on likelihoods).  As the facade of the 
new coffeehouse is processed, it projects onto all 
situated conceptualizations in memory that share similar 
perceptual and conceptual content.  Essentially, the 
brain attempts to categorize the situation currently 
being perceived.  When the most likely and best 
matching situated conceptualization becomes active, it 
categorizes the current situation as a similar type of 
situation.  On some occasions, the best fitting situated 
conceptualization might come from a category of 
familiar repeated situations; on others, it might come 
from a specific memory of a unique situation. 
Based on the contributions of likelihoods to this 
process, the more features that a situated 
conceptualization shares with the current situation, the 
more likely it is that the situated conceptualization will 
become active.  As we will see later, this matching 
assumption is useful in explaining problematic issues 
associated with social priming. 
As a situated conceptualization becomes active in 
memory, it produces inferences about what is likely to 
occur in the current situation.  Based on the inferential 
process of pattern completion, content in the activated 
situated conceptualization that has not yet been 
perceived is inferred as likely to occur.  On seeing the 
new coffeehouse, for example, the situated 
conceptualization that becomes active might produce 
inferences that the coffeehouse is likely to have tables, 
chairs, and coffee inside, that people are likely to be 
talking, reading, and working, and that the atmosphere 
is likely to be friendly, cerebral, and hip.  Typically, 
these inferences occur involuntarily as the situated 
conceptualization becomes active, with some of them 
being conscious and others being unconscious. 
Two important properties of this process are, 
first, any aspect of a situation can activate a 
situated conceptualization, and, second, any aspect 
of a situated conceptualization can be inferred as a 
pattern completion inference.  Imagine, for 
example, that a situated conceptualization was 
established while hearing a someone sing a song at 
a New Year’s Eve party.  On later revisiting the 
party setting, the setting could reactivate the 
situated conceptualization and produce a memory 
of the song as a pattern completion inference, or it 
could produce any other aspect of the party (e.g., 
the people present).  Conversely, later hearing the 
song on the radio could activate the same situated 
conceptualization, producing the setting for the 
party as a pattern completion inference, or again 
any other aspect of the event.  In general, any 
feature of a situated conceptualization, when 
encountered later, can activate the situated 
conceptualization and produce its other features as 
inferences.  The dynamic flexibility of pattern 
completion inferences will also play important 
roles later in explaining problematic issues 
associated with social priming. 
Multimodal simulation.  Finally, the situated 
conceptualization framework assumes that pattern 
completion inferences are typically implemented as 
multimodal simulations [4,7,14,15].  On seeing a 
new coffeehouse, for example, the inferences that it 
contains tables, chairs, and coffee are likely to be 
implemented by reenacting brain states previously 
experienced for perceiving these objects [16].  
Analogously, inferences that people will be talking, 
reading, and working are likely to be implemented 
by reenacting brain states previously associated 
with performing these activities [17], and 
inferences about more abstract qualities of the 
situation are likely to be implemented by 
reenacting brain states associated with experiencing 
these qualities previously [8,18]. 
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In this manner, activating a situated 
conceptualization related to the current situation 
partially reinstates the original situation in the 
brain’s situation processing architecture.  By 
reenacting the original situation, the pattern 
completion process provides a concrete sense of 
being in the situation physically, acting in it, and 
responding to it emotionally.  By superimposing 
the simulated situated conceptualization on the 
current situation, the pattern completion process 
guides perception, action, and affective states as the 
situation unfolds. 
Applications.  The situated conceptualization 
framework informs a broad variety of 
psychological phenomena [7].  For any 
phenomenon, a person’s past situational experience 
affects the pattern completion inferences that they 
produce in new situations.  In perception and 
action, for example, this framework helps explain 
object affordances and scene inferences.  In 
cognition, this framework similarly helps explain 
the cuing of episodic memories, the production of 
comprehension inferences, and basic reasoning 
strategies.  In social cognition, this approach helps 
explain social embodiment, social priming, and 
social mirroring.  In affective science, this 
approach helps explain emotion and conditioning.  
In appetitive processes, this approach helps explain 
desire, habits, implementation intentions, and goal 
priming [19]. 
Finally, the situated conceptualization 
framework offers a natural account of individual 
differences across diverse phenomena [7,8,19,20].  
To the extent that different individuals experience 
different kinds of situations related to a specific 
phenomenon, different populations of situated 
conceptualizations accrue in their respective 
memories.  If, for example, different individuals 
experience different kinds of eating situations, they 
accumulate different populations of situated 
conceptualizations for eating.  As a consequence, 
these different populations produce different pattern 
completion inferences to food cues on later 
occasions.  On seeing pizza, for example, people 
who often consume pizza generate pattern 
completion inferences that anticipate the taste, 
reward, actions associated with consuming it.  
Conversely, dieters who never eat pizza generate 
different pattern completion inferences, perhaps 
including the inhibition of taste and reward 
simulations, together with the activation of healthy 
eating goals.  In a similar manner, individual 
differences arise across all the phenomena 
mentioned earlier, including affordances [21], 
mirroring [22], and emotion [8]. 
Social Priming as Pattern Completion 
Inferences from Situated Conceptualizations 
As many researchers have shown, just about 
any element of a social situation can prime some 
other aspect of the situation (for a recent review 
and discussion of findings, see the supplemental 
2014 issue of Social Cognition).  For example, skin 
color, age, gender, and culture can prime traits and 
stereotypes.  Inferred traits and perceived situations 
can prime expected actions of others.  Foods, 
drinks, in-group members, and out-group members 
can prime one’s own goals and actions.  Bodily 
states, temperature, weight, cleanliness, color, and 
shape can prime evaluations and affect.  On and on 
it goes across decades of research in social 
psychology, with just about any aspect of a social 
situation functioning as both a prime and a primed 
response. 
The situated conceptualization framework 
offers a natural account of social priming and its 
ubiquitous character.  As a person experiences 
social situations, situated conceptualizations of 
them are constructed.  As these situated 
conceptualizations accumulate in memory, they 
offer extensive sources of pattern completion 
inferences on subsequent occasions.  When one of 
their elements is encountered (e.g., skin color, 
gender, age), it activates a relevant situated 
conceptualization containing the element, 
producing remaining elements as pattern 
completion inferences, including evaluation, affect, 
action, and so forth.   Because any aspect of these 
situated conceptualizations can trigger this process, 
or be the outcome of it, social priming takes 
infinitely many forms. 
Explaining the difficulty of defining social 
priming.  As just implied, one reason it’s difficult to 
define social priming is because any aspect of a 
social situation can be a prime or a primed response.  
The generality of this process suggests that social 
priming is not a meaningful category and should not 
be viewed as a coherent phenomenon [23].  A more 
important reason—from the theoretical perspective 
developed here—is that social priming is just 
another instance of pattern completion inferences 
from situated conceptualizations.  As we saw earlier, 
pattern completion inferences don’t just occur for 
social priming, but for virtually all cognitive, social, 
affective, and appetitive phenomena.  In this regard, 
social priming is hardly unique but just one more 
instance of a basic cognitive process, perhaps one of 
the most basic in the brain [24].  From this 
perspective, it could be useful to forego the construct 
of social priming and focus on more meaningful 
mechanisms and phenomena [23]. 
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Explaining the frequent modulation of social 
priming.  Researchers frequently report that social 
priming doesn’t simply result via direct associations 
from perceptions to goals, emotions, and/or 
behaviors, but is often modulated by a host of other 
variables.  Construals of self, others, and the current 
situation, for example, frequently contribute to 
specific goals and behaviors that are primed [25].  
Many articles in the supplemental issue of Social 
Cognition (2014) further document such modulation 
[e.g., 26], with some articles focusing on specific 
modulators, including motivational significance 
[23], resource availability [27], self-concepts 
[28,29], and prime source [30]. 
The situated conceptualization framework 
offers a natural account of these modulatory 
effects, drawing on two of its basic assumptions 
[19,20,31]:  First, when a social situation is 
experienced, all salient and relevant aspects of it 
are processed perceptually and conceptually, 
thereby becoming stored as elements of the situated 
conceptualization established in memory.  Second, 
when a prime is encountered, it activates relevant 
situated conceptualizations, with the best-fitting 
one becoming active to guide processing of the 
current situation. 
Together, these two assumptions naturally 
explain the modulation of social priming.  When a 
prime is encountered, it is embedded in a current 
situation that contains a broad ensemble of 
situational elements.  Not only does the prime 
project onto situated concept conceptualizations in 
memory, the prime plus the entire ensemble of 
current situational elements projects onto memory.  
Thus, the activation of the best fitting situated 
conceptualization not only reflects how well the 
prime matches stored situated conceptualizations, 
but how well the entire ensemble matches them.  
From this perspective, prime responses are more 
likely to occur when a prime is encountered in a 
similar ensemble of situational elements than in a 
dissimilar ensemble.  Most importantly, all the 
kinds of modulators addressed in the social priming 
literature are obvious candidates for situational 
elements that become stored in situated 
conceptualizations, and whose presence or absence 
later modulates the activation of primed responses. 
If this account is correct, the situation is much 
more extreme than imagined previously, because 
virtually any element of a situation can modulate 
social priming, not just those noted so far in the 
literature.  Many previous reviews have 
documented the exquisite sensitivity of cognition 
and behavior to the presence of detailed contextual 
information [5,19,31–33].  Thus, it should not be 
surprising that social priming reflects this exquisite 
sensitivity as well. 
Explaining the difficulty of replicating social 
priming.  Based on the evolving social priming 
literature, it’s fair to say that simple direct pathways 
from primes to primed responses rarely, if ever, exist.  
Instead, these pathways often appear to be modulated 
by a host of situational variables.  An additional 
complicating factor is that once a situated 
conceptualization becomes active, additional factors 
adapt it to the current situation [34,35].  In the process, 
a primed response that becomes active as a pattern 
completion inference might be modified in some way, 
such that a novel response to the prime occurs. 
According to the situated conceptualization 
framework, obtaining a robust social priming effect 
requires at least three enabling conditions.  First, it 
is necessary that all, or at least many, participants 
have had similar situational experience with the 
prime and primed response, such that they have 
situated conceptualizations containing both in 
memory.  Second, it is necessary that there be a 
high overlap between the situational elements 
encountered with the prime and the situational 
elements stored in the relevant situated 
conceptualizations.  Third, it is necessary that the 
prime not be stored with other situated 
conceptualizations having different responses, 
which are more frequent and/or a better match to 
the current situation than situated 
conceptualizations containing the target primed 
response. 
To the extent that any of these conditions is 
not met, a given participant may not produce a 
primed response of interest.  Given the diverse 
situational experience that people have, both in the 
past and in the current moment, it seems likely that 
diverse responses to a prime will occur regularly. 
Reconceptualizing Social Priming 
Common theoretical accounts of social 
priming assume that it results from spreading 
activation in semantic networks or in perception-
action associations [36–38].  As we have seen, the 
extensive presence of modulating factors greatly 
complicates these accounts, requiring the presence 
of complex pathways between primes and primed 
responses.  Perhaps a more serious problem is the 
implicit assumption that social priming paradigms 
test the structure of semantic networks and 
perception-action associations.  From this 
perspective, if a social priming phenomenon is well 
understood, it should be possible to present primes 
to a representational system and observe the 
predicted primed responses.  In other words, the 
standard focus is on understanding what social 
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priming tells us about the static structure of 
semantic networks and perception-action 
associations. 
The situated conceptualization framework 
offers a very different way of thinking about social 
priming.  From this perspective, social priming 
results from pattern completion inferences that 
underlie intelligent goal-directed behavior in 
general.  More importantly, this approach assumes 
that the primary purpose of pattern completion 
inferences is to guide cognition, emotion, and 
behavior during meaningful situated action in the 
world [4,39].  Thus, when a situated 
conceptualization becomes active to process a 
current situation, it produces a package of 
anticipatory inferences—implemented as 
multimodal simulations—to support intelligent goal 
pursuit in the current environment.  Possible 
inferences include perceptual anticipations of what 
is likely to occur, simulations of possible reward, 
potential actions that could be performed, likely 
outcomes that could result, and so forth.  Rather 
than being the mechanical outputs of a detached 
semantic network, pattern completion inferences 
occur as a broad package of multimodal inferences 
that guide an agent’s intelligent action in the current 
situation. 
Furthermore, the situated conceptualization 
framework offers a principled account of the 
knowledge structures that develop to produce these 
packages of multimodal inferences.  Every time a 
situation is experienced, the states of all systems 
active at the time in the brain’s situation processing 
architecture are captured in memory as a situated 
conceptualization [1,4,7,14].  Rather than being 
stored as abstract symbolic propositions that 
describe these states, the actual states of these 
systems themselves are stored.  On later occasions, 
when situational cues activate this situated 
conceptualization, they partially reactivate these 
states, thereby implementing a multimodal 
simulation of the processing that occurred during 
the situation.  From this perspective, social 
priming—and pattern completion inferences in 
general—reflect the reinstatement of previous 
situational activity, guiding current situational 
activity in the moment. 
To the extent that previously-experienced 
situational elements are encountered in a current 
situation that has little relevance or meaning for a 
person, these elements are unlikely to activate 
relevant situated conceptualizations.  If no 
meaningful goal exists for the person in the current 
situation, then the broad ensemble of situational 
cues is unlikely to activate relevant situated 
conceptualizations, which most likely did include 
meaningful goals previously.  A recent meta-
analysis illustrates that social priming effects are 
indeed stronger when relevant goals are being 
pursued [40,41].  Strong effects of self-relevance in 
the social priming literature further illustrate this 
point [28,29]. 
Thus, the situated conceptualization 
framework suggests that the most informative way 
of studying pattern completion inferences—
including social priming—is to study them as 
packages of situated inferences—delivered as 
multimodal simulations—during goal-directed 
activity in situations currently meaningful to the 
participant.  Accounts of social priming have begun 
exploring related possibilities [28,42,43].  Clearly, 
however, much remains to be learned about how 
the situated conceptualization framework operates.  
Indeed, we currently understand little about the 
framework in any depth or with any certainty [7]. 
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